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19681

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

ment was permissible in view of the requirement of section 211
that "an action for divorce or separation shall be commenced by
the service of a summons" and the requirement of section 215-c(a)
that within 10 days after the commencement of an action for
divorce the plaintiff shall commence conciliation proceedings. The
court allowed the amendment concluding that the requirements of
the new law could be met without the service of a separate summons and the institution of a new action. The action for divorce
was deemed to have been commenced by order of the court and
the plaintiff was directed to serve his amended complaint at the
end of 120 days or the expiration of conciliation proceedings,
whichever came first.
The court referred to a conflict which existed within the second department as to whether a pleading in a separation action
could be amended in light of the new law. The two cases cited
by the court to illustrate the conflict, however, can be reconciled.
In Saunders v. Saunders, 59 the plaintiff moved to amend her
complaint on the condition that she would not be compelled to
proceed to conciliation as required by section 215-c, whereas in
Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick 10 where the amendment was granted, no
such limitation was requested.
While the court in Saunders refused to extend its opinion
beyond the facts of that case, it appears that a court can have little
objection to allowing the amendment so long as the conciliation
proceedings are administered, especially in view of the court's
attitude that "the ends of justice will be better served by the
avoidance of two actions." 161
DRL § 215: Failure to file timely notice of commencenwnt of
divorce action with conciliation bureau held excusable.
CPLR 2004 provides that except where otherwise expressly
prescribed by law the court may "extend the time fixed by any
statute . . . for doing any act, upon such terms as may be just
and upon cause shown, whether the application for extension is
made before or after the expiration of the time fixed."
In Rodriguez v. Cowin,16 2 the court applied the above provision to a newly enacted section of the Domestic Relations Law,
215-c(a). This section provides that notice of the commencement
of a divorce action must be filed within ten days after its commencement with the conciliation bureau. In Rodriguez, a number
of circumstances, such as service having to be made outside the
15954

Misc. 2d 1081, 283 N.Y.S2d 969 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967).

16055 Misc. 2d 7, 284 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1967).
161 Taplinger v. Taplinger, 55 Misc. 2d 103, 104, 284 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795

(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
16255 Misc. 2d 35, 284 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967).
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state and notice of, service arriving while the plaintiff's attorney
was away from her office, made compliance with the statute impossible. The court held, therefore, that failure to file within ten
days was excusable and was not jurisdictional or prejudicial.
Thus the court continues the policy of permitting extensions
of time when just cause is shown. The degree of "just cause"
one must show varies with the degree of prejudice resulting to the
other party by the extension of time.16 3 Thus where the degree
of prejudice is slight or non-existent, the courts have been very
liberal in granting extensions of time.""
The court in Rodriguez points out that the special proceeding
initiated by plaintiff in this case--"an application for an order to
direct the commissioner to accept the late filing"--is not needed or
warranted. In the future, an extension of time may be applied
for by an application ex parte or by a motion on notice made in
the very action initiated by the service of the summons.
JUDIcIARY LAW

Judiciary Law § 751:

Sanctions appear to be ineffective.

65
In Board of Education of City of New York v. Slanker,1
the court held that where an employee organization wilfully disregards an order enjoining its members from striking, a fine will
be imposed for criminal contempt. In accordance with Section 751
of the Judiciary Law, the United Federation of Teachers was fined
$150,000 and the president of the organization fined $250 and
sentenced to fifteen days in jail.
Violation of a court injunction has long been recognized as a
form of criminal contempt? 6 Prior to September 1, 1967, however, the maximum punishment for this violation was $250 and

thirty days in jail.167

In order to remedy the ineffectiveness of

this penalty against employee organizations as defined in Section
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(1967).
164E.g., Clarson Constr. Co. v. Vespa, 21 Misc. 2d 149, 196 N.Y.S.2d
362 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1960); Van Dyne v. Sabo, 110 N.Y.S.Zd 625
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951); In re Luckenback's Will, 196 Misc. 782,
96 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1949).
16554 Misc. 2d 941, 283 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
1-See People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr, 181 N.Y. 463, 74 N.E. 431 (1905);
People ex reL. Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. 263 (1853); Spohrer v. Cohen,
3 Misc. 2d 248, 149 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956).
167 N.Y. JuDiciARY LAw § 751.

